No. 15 of 2020 - MARITIME CYBER RISK MANAGEMENT
No. 15 of 2020 - MARITIME CYBER RISK MANAGEMENT
Published 13 Aug 2020
MARITIME AND PORT AUTHORITY OF SINGAPORE
SHIPPING CIRCULAR
NO. 15 OF 2020
MPA Shipping Division
460 Alexandra Road
21st Storey PSA Building
Singapore 119963
Fax: 6375 6231
http://www.mpa.gov.sg
13 Aug 2020
Applicable to: Shipowners, ship managers, operators, and masters of Singapore-
registered ships subjected to the ISM Code, and MPA’s Recognised Organisations
(ROs).
MARITIME CYBER RISK MANAGEMENT
- This circular provides information on the requirement to incorporate maritime
cyber risk management in the safety management systems (SMS) of companies
operating Singapore-registered ships.
- Cyber risk management refers to the process of identifying, analysing,
assessing, and communicating a cyber-related risk and accepting, avoiding,
transferring, or mitigating it to an acceptable level, considering costs and benefits of
actions taken to stakeholders.
- Maritime cyber risk refers to a measure of the extent to which a technology
asset is threatened by a potential circumstance or event, which may result in shipping-
related operational, safety or security failures as a consequence of information or
systems being corrupted, lost or compromised. The goal of maritime cyber risk
management is to support safe and secure shipping, which is operationally resilient to
cyber risks.
- As affirmed in Resolution MSC.428(98)1 (see Annex A), an approved SMS
should take into account cyber risk management in accordance with the objectives
and functional requirements of the ISM Code2, MPA will require cyber risks to be
appropriately addressed in the company’s SMS no later than the first annual
verification of the ISM company's Document of Compliance after 1 January 2021.
- In line with the guidance presented in MSC-FAL.1/Circ.3 (see Annex B), to
consider cyber risks as being appropriately addressed in SMS, the ISM company is
required to demonstrate that they have appropriately incorporated the five functional
elements to address maritime cyber risks, namely:
1 The adoption of Resolution MSC.428(98) by the IMO was informed in Shipping Circular No. 14 of
2018, Para 5(h).
2 The International Management Code for the Safe Operation of Ships and for Pollution Prevention.
Page 1 of 2
a. Identify: Define personnel roles and responsibilities for cyber risk
management and identify the systems, assets, data and capabilities that, when
disrupted, pose risks to ship operations;
b. Protect: Implement risk control processes and measures, and
contingency planning to protect against a cyber-event and ensure continuity of
shipping operations;
c. Detect: Develop and implement activities necessary to detect a cyber-
event in a timely manner;
d. Respond: Develop and implement activities and plans to provide
resilience and to restore systems necessary for shipping operations or services
impaired due to a cyber-event; and
e. Recover: Identify measures to back-up and restore cyber systems
necessary for shipping operations impacted by a cyber-event.
- ISM companies of Singapore-registered ships are reminded to review the
identified risks to its ships, personnel and the environment and to establish appropriate
safeguards to ensure that maritime cyber risks are appropriately addressed in the
SMS, and that the five functional elements stated in para 5 have been incorporated
into their risk management framework.
- MPA has co-funded several maritime cyber security courses under Maritime
Cluster Fund and Training@MaritimeSingapore. MPA is also aware that Recognised
Organisations (ROs) have developed maritime cyber security training courses and
relevant consultancy services to assist ISM Companies in developing and preparing
their cyber risk management strategy and procedures. Companies may visit
www.mpa.gov.sg or approach the ROs for more information on such training and
services.
- Any queries relating to this shipping circular should be directed to Mr Damien
Ng (email: damien_ng@mpa.gov.sg, tel: (65) 6375 1756) and Mr Zahir Abutalib
(email: zahir_abutalib@mpa.gov.sg, tel: (65) 6375 1826).
GOH CHUNG HUN
DIRECTOR OF MARINE
MARITIME AND PORT AUTHORITY OF SINGAPORE
Annex A – Resolution MSC.428(98): Maritime cyber risk management in safety
management systems
Annex B – MSC-FAL.1/Circ.3: Guidelines on maritime cyber risk management
Page 2 of 2
MSC 98/23/Add.1
Annex 10, page 1
ANNEX 10
RESOLUTION MSC.428(98)
(adopted on 16 June 2017)
MARITIME CYBER RISK MANAGEMENT IN SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS
THE MARITIME SAFETY COMMITTEE,
RECOGNIZING the urgent need to raise awareness on cyber risk threats and vulnerabilities
to support safe and secure shipping, which is operationally resilient to cyber risks,
RECOGNIZING ALSO that Administrations, classification societies, shipowners and ship
operators, ship agents, equipment manufacturers, service providers, ports and port facilities,
and all other maritime industry stakeholders should expedite work towards safeguarding
shipping from current and emerging cyber threats and vulnerabilities,
BEARING IN MIND MSC-FAL.1/Circ.3 on Guidelines on maritime cyber risk management
approved by the Facilitation Committee, at its forty-first session (4 to 7 April 2017), and by the
Maritime Safety Committee, at its ninety-eighth session (7 to 16 June 2017), which provides
high-level recommendations for maritime cyber risk management that can be incorporated into
existing risk management processes and are complementary to the safety and security
management practices established by this Organization,
RECALLING resolution A.741(18) by which the Assembly adopted the International
Management Code for the Safe Operation of Ships and for Pollution Prevention (International
Safety Management (ISM) Code) and recognized, inter alia, the need for appropriate
organization of management to enable it to respond to the need of those on board ships to
achieve and maintain high standards of safety and environmental protection,
NOTING the objectives of the ISM Code which include, inter alia, the provision of safe practices
in ship operation and a safe working environment, the assessment of all identified risks to
ships, personnel and the environment, the establishment of appropriate safeguards, and the
continuous improvement of safety management skills of personnel ashore and aboard ships,
1 AFFIRMS that an approved safety management system should take into account
cyber risk management in accordance with the objectives and functional requirements of
the ISM Code;
2 ENCOURAGES Administrations to ensure that cyber risks are appropriately
addressed in safety management systems no later than the first annual verification of the
company's Document of Compliance after 1 January 2021;
3 ACKNOWLEDGES the necessary precautions that could be needed to preserve the
confidentiality of certain aspects of cyber risk management;
4 REQUESTS Member States to bring this resolution to the attention of all stakeholders.
***
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E
4 ALBERT EMBANKMENT
LONDON SE1 7SR
Telephone: +44 (0)20 7735 7611 Fax: +44 (0)20 7587 3210
MSC-FAL.1/Circ.3
5 July 2017
GUIDELINES ON MARITIME CYBER RISK MANAGEMENT
1 The Facilitation Committee, at its forty-first session (4 to 7 April 2017), and the
Maritime Safety Committee, at its ninety-eighth session (7 to 16 June 2017), having considered
the urgent need to raise awareness on cyber risk threats and vulnerabilities, approved the
Guidelines on maritime cyber risk management, as set out in the annex.
2 The Guidelines provide high-level recommendations on maritime cyber risk
management to safeguard shipping from current and emerging cyberthreats and
vulnerabilities. The Guidelines also include functional elements that support effective cyber
risk management.
3 Member Governments are invited to bring the contents of this circular to the attention
of all stakeholders concerned.
4 This circular supersedes the interim guidelines contained in MSC.1/Circ.1526.
***
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Annex, page 1
ANNEX
GUIDELINES ON MARITIME CYBER RISK MANAGEMENT
1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 These Guidelines provide high-level recommendations for maritime cyber risk
management. For the purpose of these Guidelines, maritime cyber risk refers to a measure of
the extent to which a technology asset is threatened by a potential circumstance or event,
which may result in shipping-related operational, safety or security failures as a consequence
of information or systems being corrupted, lost or compromised.
1.2 Stakeholders should take the necessary steps to safeguard shipping from current and
emerging threats and vulnerabilities related to digitization, integration and automation of
processes and systems in shipping.
1.3 For details and guidance related to the development and implementation of specific
risk management processes, users of these Guidelines should refer to specific Member
Governments' and Flag Administrations' requirements, as well as relevant international and
industry standards and best practices.
1.4 Risk management is fundamental to safe and secure shipping operations. Risk
management has traditionally been focused on operations in the physical domain, but greater
reliance on digitization, integration, automation and network-based systems has created an
increasing need for cyber risk management in the shipping industry.
1.5 Predicated on the goal of supporting safe and secure shipping, which is operationally
resilient to cyber risks, these Guidelines provide recommendations that can be incorporated
into existing risk management processes. In this regard, the Guidelines are complementary to
the safety and security management practices established by this Organization.
2 GENERAL
2.1 Background
2.1.1 Cybertechnologies have become essential to the operation and management of
numerous systems critical to the safety and security of shipping and protection of the marine
environment. In some cases, these systems are to comply with international standards and
Flag Administration requirements. However, the vulnerabilities created by accessing,
interconnecting or networking these systems can lead to cyber risks which should be
addressed. Vulnerable systems could include, but are not limited to:
.1 Bridge systems;
.2 Cargo handling and management systems;
.3 Propulsion and machinery management and power control systems;
.4 Access control systems;
.5 Passenger servicing and management systems;
.6 Passenger facing public networks;
.7 Administrative and crew welfare systems; and
.8 Communication systems.
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2.1.2 The distinction between information technology and operational technology systems
should be considered. Information technology systems may be thought of as focusing on the
use of data as information. Operational technology systems may be thought of as focusing on
the use of data to control or monitor physical processes. Furthermore, the protection of
information and data exchange within these systems should also be considered.
2.1.3 While these technologies and systems provide significant efficiency gains for the
maritime industry, they also present risks to critical systems and processes linked to the
operation of systems integral to shipping. These risks may result from vulnerabilities arising
from inadequate operation, integration, maintenance and design of cyber-related systems, and
from intentional and unintentional cyberthreats.
2.1.4 Threats are presented by malicious actions (e.g. hacking or introduction of malware)
or the unintended consequences of benign actions (e.g. software maintenance or user
permissions). In general, these actions expose vulnerabilities (e.g. outdated software or
ineffective firewalls) or exploit a vulnerability in operational or information technology. Effective
cyber risk management should consider both kinds of threat.
2.1.5 Vulnerabilities can result from inadequacies in design, integration and/or maintenance
of systems, as well as lapses in cyberdiscipline. In general, where vulnerabilities in operational
and/or information technology are exposed or exploited, either directly (e.g. weak passwords
leading to unauthorized access) or indirectly (e.g. the absence of network segregation), there
can be implications for security and the confidentiality, integrity and availability of information.
Additionally, when operational and/or information technology vulnerabilities are exposed or
exploited, there can be implications for safety, particularly where critical systems (e.g. bridge
navigation or main propulsion systems) are compromised.
2.1.6 Effective cyber risk management should also consider safety and security impacts
resulting from the exposure or exploitation of vulnerabilities in information technology systems.
This could result from inappropriate connection to operational technology systems or from
procedural lapses by operational personnel or third parties, which may compromise these
systems (e.g. inappropriate use of removable media such as a memory stick).
2.1.7 Further information regarding vulnerabilities and threats can be found in the additional
guidance and standards referenced in section 4.
2.1.8 These rapidly changing technologies and threats make it difficult to address these
risks only through technical standards. As such, these Guidelines recommend a risk
management approach to cyber risks that is resilient and evolves as a natural extension of
existing safety and security management practices.
2.1.9 In considering potential sources of threats and vulnerabilities and associated risk
mitigation strategies, a number of potential control options for cyber risk management should
also be taken into consideration, including amongst others, management, operational or
procedural, and technical controls.
2.2 Application
2.2.1 These Guidelines are primarily intended for all organizations in the shipping industry,
and are designed to encourage safety and security management practices in the cyberdomain.
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Annex, page 3
2.2.2 Recognizing that no two organizations in the shipping industry are the same, these
Guidelines are expressed in broad terms in order to have a widespread application. Ships with
limited cyber-related systems may find a simple application of these Guidelines to be sufficient;
however, ships with complex cyber-related systems may require a greater level of care and
should seek additional resources through reputable industry and Government partners.
2.2.3 These Guidelines are recommendatory.
3 ELEMENTS OF CYBER RISK MANAGEMENT
3.1 For the purpose of these Guidelines, cyber risk management means the process of
identifying, analysing, assessing, and communicating a cyber-related risk and accepting,
avoiding, transferring, or mitigating it to an acceptable level, considering costs and benefits of
actions taken to stakeholders.
3.2 The goal of maritime cyber risk management is to support safe and secure shipping,
which is operationally resilient to cyber risks.
3.3 Effective cyber risk management should start at the senior management level. Senior
management should embed a culture of cyber risk awareness into all levels of an organization
and ensure a holistic and flexible cyber risk management regime that is in continuous operation
and constantly evaluated through effective feedback mechanisms.
3.4 One accepted approach to achieve the above is to comprehensively assess and
compare an organization's current, and desired, cyber risk management postures. Such a
comparison may reveal gaps that can be addressed to achieve risk management objectives
through a prioritized cyber risk management plan. This risk-based approach will enable an
organization to best apply its resources in the most effective manner.
3.5 These Guidelines present the functional elements that support effective cyber risk
management. These functional elements are not sequential – all should be concurrent and
continuous in practice and should be incorporated appropriately in a risk management
framework:
.1 Identify: Define personnel roles and responsibilities for cyber risk
management and identify the systems, assets, data and capabilities that,
when disrupted, pose risks to ship operations.
.2 Protect: Implement risk control processes and measures, and contingency
planning to protect against a cyber-event and ensure continuity of shipping
operations.
.3 Detect: Develop and implement activities necessary to detect a cyber-event
in a timely manner.
.4 Respond: Develop and implement activities and plans to provide resilience
and to restore systems necessary for shipping operations or services
impaired due to a cyber-event.
.5 Recover: Identify measures to back-up and restore cyber systems necessary
for shipping operations impacted by a cyber-event.
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Annex, page 4
3.6 These functional elements encompass the activities and desired outcomes of
effective cyber risk management across critical systems affecting maritime operations and
information exchange, and constitute an ongoing process with effective feedback mechanisms.
3.7 Effective cyber risk management should ensure an appropriate level of awareness of
cyber risks at all levels of an organization. The level of awareness and preparedness should
be appropriate to roles and responsibilities in the cyber risk management system.
4 BEST PRACTICES FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF CYBER RISK MANAGEMENT
4.1 The approach to cyber risk management described herein provides a foundation for
better understanding and managing cyber risks, thus enabling a risk management approach
to address cyberthreats and vulnerabilities. For detailed guidance on cyber risk management,
users of these Guidelines should also refer to Member Governments' and Flag Administrations'
requirements, as well as relevant international and industry standards and best practices.
4.2 Additional guidance and standards may include, but are not limited to:1
.1 The Guidelines on Cyber Security Onboard Ships produced and supported
by BIMCO, CLIA, ICS, INTERCARGO, INTERTANKO, OCIMF and IUMI.
.2 ISO/IEC 27001 standard on Information technology – Security techniques –
Information security management systems – Requirements. Published jointly
by the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and the
International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC).
.3 United States National Institute of Standards and Technology's Framework
for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity (the NIST Framework).
4.3 Reference should be made to the most current version of any guidance or standards
utilized.
___________
1 The additional guidance and standards are listed as a non-exhaustive reference to further detailed
information for users of these Guidelines. The referenced guidance and standards have not been issued by
the Organization and their use remains at the discretion of individual users of these Guidelines.
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